The Power of Congress to Regulate Commerce between the States with an Especial Consideration of the Interstate Commerce Act by Blood, Charles H.
Cornell Law Library
Scholarship@Cornell Law: A Digital Repository
Historical Theses and Dissertations Collection Historical Cornell Law School
1888
The Power of Congress to Regulate Commerce
between the States with an Especial Consideration
of the Interstate Commerce Act
Charles H. Blood
Cornell Law School
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.cornell.edu/historical_theses
Part of the Law Commons
This Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by the Historical Cornell Law School at Scholarship@Cornell Law: A Digital Repository. It has
been accepted for inclusion in Historical Theses and Dissertations Collection by an authorized administrator of Scholarship@Cornell Law: A Digital
Repository. For more information, please contact jmp8@cornell.edu.
Recommended Citation
Blood, Charles H., "The Power of Congress to Regulate Commerce between the States with an Especial Consideration of the Interstate
Commerce Act" (1888). Historical Theses and Dissertations Collection. Paper 87.
The Cornell School of Law.
Thesis
The Power of Congress to Regulate Commerce between




The passage of the "Interstate Comme: ce Act" is
sugr,estive of the fact thaL changes in theorics, long
unquestioned, -cegard'in< the true relations which exist
between State and citizen are being made simultaneously
with changes in in lustrial methods. These are no less
interesting from a legal, than from a r-olitical, social
an( econoical point of viev. Te lissez faire doctrie
of ti-e Physiocrats that absolute freedom of corjpetition
1rill conduce to the highest ',,elf&re of socieLy seems
not well adapted, in many resj ects, to an age of ccr-
poratirns and vast, accupiulatins of capital, and occasion-
all, Reli]amies are found who a-,e confilent that the true
solution of all social problems is to be found in ab-
solute governriental regulation of all industries.
Absurd, doubtlessly, as are such s~uiested remedies,
their mere existence, nevemitheless, but p ,ves the pres-
once of actual evi.s and we may wonder if it be not
indicative of a tendency on th-e part of the ,-ove'mient
to assume a supe,-visi(,n and control of private incdus-
t ri es.
That Congr-ess, in the passage of the "Interstate
-o mnerce Act," 1.as exercised an auth(:r'ity over indi-Tid-
uals acting, in a private capacity, never before attempt
ed by any such sweeping measure is unquestioned, but
that the passage of similar measures in reference to
other indiistries would be impr'obable is apparent if
we but consider the nature of the interprise to which
the Act applies. Railroading is a quasi-public husi-
ness, and because of its peculiarly commercial nature,
congress may, 'rithout violatin the constitution of the
United States, subject it to g'"eater ]'estrictinns than
o -dinary enterpIises conducted by private capital.
The constitutional right of the legislature to
pass the Act is conferred by Section 8 of Article I of
the constitution of the United States, according tr, the
provisions of which congress is given the power "to
regulate cori-nerce with foreign nations, -nd among the
several States and with the Indian tribes." A due
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conception of the extent of the powers which ,ere intend-
ed to be conveyed upon congress by this section can only
adequately be conceived by a consideraticn of the high
regard in which this provision was held at the time of
its adoption in the constitution, and this of course,
can only be appreciated by a perusal of the debates in
the constitutional convpntion, as reported in the "Fed-
eralist". Suffice it to say that the imbecility of the
confederation was largely due to the policy of protection
and commercial discriminations which was maintained byF the
various states with the consequent excitation of ani-
mosities between the States, so that "the need of
some equitable and just regrglation of cormerce wras
among the most influential causes leadin- to the con-
stitutional con-ention." "It was intended" said the
learned judge in Cook v. State of Pa. 97 U. S. 586 in
his allusion to the power conferred upon Congress to
regulate comnerce, "to guard ag$ainst any taxation by
the states "-hich would interfere with the freest inter-
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change of cormnodities amon the people of the different
Stai es." (WVabash, St. Louis and Pacific R. R. v.
Illinois 1]) U. S. 557) or, as was suggested by Ar. M,4adi
son in 37,1, it was indispensFbly necessary hat the
Unit eJ States; in Congress assembled, should be vested
with the right of superintending the commercial r;]a-
tions of every/ state, that none might tak place which
should be cont, ary to the general inte-iests. The inten-
tion to ,-"move the discriminations which existe-d under
the Confederation fhu-ther appears by Section 9 of
Article I of the Constitution which provides that "'To
tax or duty shall b( laid on ary articles exported from
any state. No preference shall be given by any regu-
lation of cor n-rce or revenue Lo the ports of one state
over those of another, nor shall vessels bound to or
from one state be obliged to enter, clear oy, pay duties
in another."
Although Secticns F and 9 of Article T, as cited,
confer in terms upon (Iongress the right Lo r.gulate
commerce between the States" end by the rngulation of
commerce must clearly be ircluded the r-g-1ation of
railroads as an instrunent of cormerce, yet it can in
no wise be claimed that this power to re,,ilate is
absolute but on the cont 'ary, it must be subjected to
certain limitations and restrictions. Ry the Fifth
Amendment of the constitution of' the United States it is
provided that "No person shall be deprived of life,
liberty oi' property without due process of law; nor
shall private property be taken for public use without
just compensation", and as is suggested by 1,1r. Van HoIst
in his work on "Constitutional Jimi~r44-&s(p 252) the
use of the term "clue p-ocess of law" places a limitation
upon the powers of the legislative as well as upon those
of the executive and judicial de partments of the gov-
ernment. It would therefore be clea-ly unlawful for
congress in the exercise of its powers to r-,gulate
railroads to compel them to continue business at a loss
or to establish such low rates as to render 11'ofits ia-
possible. As a general mle it is doubtlessly true, as
was so clearlr express by 4 Justice Field in his
dissenting opinion in the case of 11unn v. State of
Illinois 94 IT. S. 1]3, that "those whn ow,,n property
have the right to fix the compensation at Which they
will allow its use, and that those who control services
r-ave a right to fix the compensation at which they will
be rendered"; yet in the case of railroads, possessed
as they are of a quasi-public character, it has long
been conceded that a prevention of improper profits
could not be considered a depy'ivation of property .vith-
out due process of law 1rithin tlhe meaning or the consti-
tutional prohibitirn. In fact as early as tile year 1810,
in the English case of Aldmitt v. Inglis 12 East 527,
Lo'd Ellenborough said "There is no doubt that the
general principle is fa'kored that every man may fix
w ,at price he pleases upon his o-n property, but if for
a particular purpose the public have a ri-ht to resort
to the premises and he have a vonopoly of them, if' he
7
will take thn benefit of that monopoly, he must, as an
equivalent, perform the duty attached to it orm reason:-
ble terms." The Enlish rule has, unquestionabjy heen
recognized in thas contry, for in an action brought
in the year 1876 by the Chicago, !,urlington and Quinccy
Railroad af inst the State of Iowa,94 U. S. 155, the
defendant had pasf ed an act regulating charges on
railroads and the plaintiff claimed such act to be a
violation of S-ction lt = of the Fourteenth Amendment
rhich ro-wrided that "Ho State shal, dprive anry p-son
of life, liberty or property without due process of
law." In rendering the decision of the court in favor
of' the defend:nt Chief Justice Waite said "Railroads
are chartered and given extrao;,dinary powers b the
legislature in order tha; they may the better serve
the public in that capcity, an, thprefor,: they are
subject to legislative control as to rates of fare."
In this case the court suggested that the riirht of
legislative control H2]lwa1rs existed and could not be
8
lost by mere non-user for t!1enty years, intimating, that
it would be unlawful to exercise it unless occasion de-
iranded, inasmucl- as no government ought unnecessarily
to interfere ,ith the private rights of its citizens.
Twelve irears later in 1,,88 Judge Love thus concisely
siumnarized the relation which exists between sovereigrnty
and railroads "hVnoever in 1-y opinion, in a legal rro-
ceeding considers a railway company as a corporation
for mer'e pecuniary profit to the owners of the I roperty,
without taking into account their character as 'qusi-
Tublic corporations' having public dut-ies to pr rfol-rfm,
takes a viewf of the s.-ibject altogether narrow and
misleading. It is the duty of the government to provide
and reulate because indizrensable to izociety and be-
cause inC'ividuals -.re incompetent to establish and
control them." (Chicago, Burlinf-ton and (Tuircey R. R.
Co. v. Thirlin ton C. '. and 'T. T, Co. 34 -,d. Rep. 481.)
The rule as it exists to-day was concisely expressed by
Lord Chief Justice Fale, tVwe huandred yeir- ago, when
he said "when property is affected -rith a public inter-
est it ce ses to b' private property only."
In the interpretation of the com erce clause of
the constitution, h'wever, there has been, as regards
the relation supposed to exist between the general
government and the states in reference to the power of
regulating commerce, a confusing number of conflicting
decisions and opinions, and judicial interpretation did
not reco~rnize the absoluueli exclusive jurisdiction
of congress over subjects of interstate commerce until
within a very recent period. In fact by the almost
unanimous concurrence of decisions before 1886 the States
were allowed in certain cases, to exercise a certain
amount of control over interstate conmnerce. In a case
decided in 1X76 (>iunn v. State or Tljinois 94 U. S.
113) the judge said "It is not ererything which Aff'ects
commerce which amounts to a regulation of it, within
the meaning of the constitution. The regulation of
elevators is of domestic concern and until congress
acts directly in reference to interstate relations
the state may exercise all acts of government over
them," althou,--l it was conceded that inte-rstate corn-
mrerce wras affected by sucl regulation. And again in
the case of the Chicago, Lu ']inpton and fluincey R. R.
v. State of Iowa 94 U. S. 155, the court said "A State
rsy pass such rules as are necessary to promote the
welfare of its citizens within its own jurisdiction
even though those without the state may be indirectly
affected." The same general principle was recognized as
early as 1829 in Vrillson v. Blackbird Creek iiarsh Co.
2 Peters 245, and as late as ](02 in Transportation Co.
". Petersburg 207 IT. 2. 691. In the latter case the
complainant claimed that wharfage charges were unrea-
sonable and amounted to a regulation of interstate
commerce. The court, h vever, held that the subject
matter was private property, primarily subject to local
state laws and that until congress had acted, the United
States could not act through its courts upon tl-e sub-
j ,ct.
V- ri-ht to interfere directly, however, ,rith
interstate commerce was seldom claimed by the States
and in 1270 (]5 71al]ace 27)2) an act of' the Pennsylvania
legislature was held void which levied a tax upon all
freight car-oied through tl e state by any railroad; and
in Hall v. DeCuir 95 U. S. 4 5, the court said "It
is hard to draw the line which separates the powers
of the states from the exclusive powers of congress,
but we may safely say that a state which seeks to impose
a direct burden upon interstate commerce or to int.-rfere
directly with its freedom does encroach on the exclusive
powers of congress." Thus in Gibbons v. Og-den 9 Wheaton
1, a state law givin- Livingston and Fulton the exclu-
sive right to navigate Yeu York waters with steam was
held unconstitutional as a direct inte- ference with
commerce while in 107 7T. V. G78 a regulation of the times
of opening and closing bridges was considered -itl1in
the jurisdiction of the State as only indirectly af-
fecting Commerce. This distinction, so long preserved,
uindoubt edly o'Aed its exist ence to a large extent, to
the high regard in which was held the police power of
the states. In a case decided as late as the year 1885
(The C 1oucester Ferr y Co. v. State of Pa. 114 U. S. 196)
the court said "It was not intended by the ,rant to
congress of power to regalate commerce to supercede or
interfere Aitl the power of the State to establish
police regulations fort the better protection and enjoy-
ment of property. As the general police power can be
better exercised bir local authority and r-ischiefs are
not likely to sprinr, theefrom so long as power to
arrest collision resides in the national congress,
the regulation by congress cannot often exclude the
establishment of other regulat ions by the state cover-
ing ver'y many particulars." And again "As to those
1ijec s of covinerce which are local o- limited in
their nature or sphere of action, the state may prescribe
- egulations until congress assumes control of them; as
to such as are national in their character and require
uniformity of regulation the power of congress is ex-
elusive and until congress acts such commerce is en-
titled to be free from state exactions and burdens."
The law therefore in 1885 was not essentially differ-
ent from that recoFnized in I(24 whfi4Sthe chief justice
in Gibbon v. Ogden 9 Wheaten I, suigested that "If a
state in passing laws on subjects acknowledged to be
within its control and with a view to those objects,
shall adopt a measure of the same c aracter w'hich
congress jay aopot (but has not yet adopted) "it does
not derive its authority from the 1particu]ar po"Ter
granted, r ut froom some other which remains vritl the
state." Consequently we find that until the year 188 ,
in the absence of express regulations by congress,
interstate commerce might be burdened to a large
extent by the states if the burdensome laws but took
the nature of police regulations. Since the decision
in the abash, St. Louis and Pacific R. R. v. State of
Illinois 11S IT. S. 557, ;he decisicns of the Supreme
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Court recognizing t-e legality of t} e exercise of the
police power of the states although thereby inteestate
commerce ,ight be indir'ectly effected h1 as been ex)ress-
ly r-pudiated. In "In re Parber 39 Fed. Rep. 641",
where under the pretence of in exercise of the police
r, ower, a sale of dressed meats was prohibited in
-innesota unless the animal was inspected alive twenty-
four hours before such sale, the (pestion was raised
as to the extent of the powers reserved to the states
end in the Federal Constitution. The court decided
the law requiring such inspection to be unconstititional
and suggested that although the police power of af-
fording protection to health was a -ecognized power,
yet it should not usurp federal powers, "and courts
will look at the effect and operation of any law and
will not be controlled by its mere form ." One year
later in 1207 the question socmed to be finally set-
tled the court declaring in the case of "2uFler v.
State of Y5ansas 123 U. S. 623, that a "state when
providing for the protection of the public health, the
public morals or public safety is subject to the para-
mount authority of the Constitution of the United States;
and may not violate rights secured or guaranteed by
that instrument or interfere viith the execution of
powers confided to the general government."
Althou'gh, therefore, it must no, be conceded that
no urgencr for the use of the police power can author,-
ize a state to exercise it in regard to a subject
matter which has been confided exclusively to the dis-
cretion of congress by the Constitution, yet a just
recognition of stste rights renders it imperative
that an exercise of police power should not be regarded
as an unconstitutional act merely because it may result
in an interference wvith interstate commerce. On the
contrary it must be clearly esiablished that the law
in question must necessarily result in such interference
or its constitutionality will not be questioned.
(Dizo v. Lord 36 Federal Reporter 05]. (18) )
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The absolute exclusiveness of the lower of Congress
to deal with interstate commerce having been established.,
it will not, be foreign to our purpose to note the com-
prehensiveness of the term itself and the liberality
displayed in its interpretation in order' that we may the
more readily appreciate the liberal powers assuned by
Congress in the passage of the"Interstate Cornerce Act."
The complaints alleging a violation of the provision of
the Constitution which confers upon Congress the ex-
clusive power to regulate commerce, Pare been innumerabl,;
as varied in their nature as the numberless forms with
which interstate commerce may be clothed in a coiver'cial
nation like our own, subdivided as it is into nearly
half q hiundred states and territories. The reguIhtion
of commerce we have seen to have been one of the main
objects of the formation of our constitution and con-
sequently it is deemed necessary that the grant be as
large as the mischief. In consequence of the liberal
construction it has been exer-cised as rell in the
prohibitiQn of lmif-pilotage fe es when permitted by
state laws, as in declaring unconstitutional statutes
requiring licenses of foreign peddlers and importers.
(,eal v. Aleraeda 31 Fed. Rep. 36,-; Welton v. State of
M,,issouri 91 U. S. 275; Brown v. Mlaryland 12 IvWheaton
419-443.) As was suggested by the court in the latter
cease, freedom of commerce involves both liberty of
importation and of sale, for there can be little dif-
ference between a tax imposed upon goods as they enter
the state and one imposed immediately afterwards,
"for weo-e it other;iise the real objects of the constitu-
tional provision mig ht be defeated." So, too, a
license tax on express companies was held unconstitution-
al (United States Express Co. v. Allen 39 7ed. Rep. 712)
as not sufficiently distinguished between state and inte-
state coimylerce; and a tax on tele -rph poles was for
the same reason held invalid as to a corrpany -nraged
in both state and interstate business (City ef St. Louis
v. West.Union Telegr'-., i Co. 39 Fed. Rep. 59). It is
thus very apparent that the commercial power of con-
gress is wide reaching in its operation. As the
learned Justice Bradley remarked in ]-,F7 "The r.ower
to regulate, as a-p1,ied to the general government, has
a ,-most extensive application. 7Witli regard to commerce
it has been expressly held that it is not confined to
commercial transactions, but ex-tends to seamanship,
navigation, and all the appliances and facilities of
commerce, and it must extend to these or it cannot
embrace the whole subject. Stockton v. ' altimore and
. . R. R. Co. 32 Federal Reporter 9.
W4e must, not, however, infer from the nature of
the cases already cited, that the power of the general
government is limited to the prevention of interference
on the part of the states with interstate c,,,nerce.
On the contrary, conrress has affirmrtive powiers and
ma- exercise active cont"ol of commerce between the
states. In the language of Judge Story, as quoted
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from the case of The United States v. ('ooD-bs 12 Pet-rs
2, "Congress !-as gen, ral authority to make all laws
necessary to execute its delegated ccnstitutional
powers." Accordingly in l :E{"7 congress authorized the
building of a bridge across an interstate navigable
stream in 1"LaryTand although the State strongly ob-
jected to such construction, and the question being
r'aised in the action of Decker against The Baltimore
and T,7. Y. R. R. Co. 30 Fed. Rep. 723, the Supreme
Court of the United States declared the exercise of
such po-,er to be constitutional; and in another case
almost identical v 1ith the one last cited, the same
court declared that congress not only might confer
upon a p'ivate corporation the right to construct such
a brid,,,e but might also grant to such corporation land
belonging to an objecting state for' the purpose of such
construction. Pennsylvania R. R. Co. v. I3altimo'e &
T. Y. Ry Co. 37 Fed. Rep. 29. T ese decisions, alone,
are cfficient in a ,eneral -ray, to sustain the con-
stitutionality of the "Intf,'state ComA rce Act," and
as Justce Field remarked in ]723, although !-;e was
one of those who most strenuously fa-vored the rii-hts
of the States to interfere ,rith interstate commerce
unier an exercise of the police power, "Congress has
the exclusive and affirmative right of control of that
portion of commerce with foreign countries and mnong
the States which consists of the carriage of persons
and the transportation, purchase, sale and exchange
of commodities. "
The commercial power of congress having been more
o- less fully considered and the constitutionality of
affirmative action established, it remains for us to
consider some rhat more in detail the exercise of this
power as arplied to railway legislation and the "Inter-
state Commerce Act."
For several decades it has been apparent, for
various reasons the princip&6 of which, perhaps, is
the wonder'ful and rapid developrient of railway in-
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d'isiries and conseqiient changing ,etbods, that the old
rules of the Common Lawv upon the subject of commerce
were no longer applicable to present methods of trans-
portation and consequently attempts have been made
ver--r generally, to supplement them by statutes. It is
most interesting to note the marked change in the charac
ter of this railway legislation in the United States
since 1870. Berore that date all legislation seems
to have been made for the purpose of assisting railwiay
construction by such measures as legislative land grants
nd the bonding of to-,,ns. Since the marked tendency,
however, of later ,r-.ars, of consolidation ,nc exten-
3ion, the aim of legislation has been tlhe remedy of
abuses, the protecti(,n of the shiprer rather than the
protection of the railroad investor. Prior to the
]assage of The "Interstate Correrce Act" all remedial
railway legislation -as made by the states and conse-
quently was local nO ineffectual zind y',t may be con-
sidered of inesuimable value as pavinr" tihe --Tay for
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intelli ont con;ressioInal action. Te "Granger" legis-
lation, between 170 and 1177, in attempting 1,o estab-
lish iron clad rules and fixed rates of charges
Por railroads was not only probably unconstitutional
when viewed in the light of' the last decision of the
Supreme Court of the United States rendered Mlarch 24th,
2870 in the case of The Chicago, M. & St. P. Ry. Co. v.
State of Minnes(ta, but was also no-[ based upon a scien-
tific study of the railway problem and consequently
failed most certainly to accomplish the good results
aimed at, yet. it just as certainly served a groat pur-
pose by attracting public attention and thus revealing
a ce"tain conception of the true relation which rail-
,.:v %ras bear to th-e public. Such 1egisl-t ion was invali-
dated, it is said, not so much by constitutional limit-
ations as by industrial ones.
The next effort. to regulate abuses, made between
1280 an-I 18S5, was one based on a sounder policy, I
refer to the establishment of raiway corissions,
whicll possesse, little real administrative power but
were to secure reform Through publicity, to shape
legislation rather than to make arbitrary laws, and
which therefore 'ern unquestionably constitutional
according to the decision of the Supreme (,o'irt, last
cited. The I-assachusetts Commission, a3though at first
ridiculed because of its lack of power, soon gained
the confidence nnd respect not only of the public
generally but of the rail,'oad officials themselves,
it appearing that the permanent interests of the cor-
porations and of the public were closely allied, and
consequently other states were not slow in establish-
ing, similar commissions. The worst feature, however,
of these commissions was to be found in their lack of
jurisdiction ov r questions of interstate comme-ce,
which is so closely and in so many ways '-onnected vith
state commerce, and attempts to adjust the relations
between the t-ro have been made ever since the proposal
of the "Reagan Bill" in 1878, finally cul;.nating
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in the action taken I)r congress in the passage of the
"Interstate Commrrerce Act" in 1887.
The success or failure of this, practically the
first attempt of congress to regulate interstate com-
rnerce, andt the merits of the act itself can only be
estimated by its success in operation. Its most commen-
dible feature, by far, judging niot merely by the light
of previous 1egislation but in the light of its actual
operation, is not to be found in the comprehensiveness
of the act, not so much in the number and detail of
its provisions as in their flexibility. Congress
recognized the fact that the old maxium tlhat "every
rule has its exceptions" was applicable in an unusual
degree to railroads. While recognizing the fact that
railroad vn-rs and the consequent fluctuation of rates
"rendered business contracts little more than lotteries"
and tended to desiroy public confidence, they did not
make the remedy worse than the evij, as lid the Grangers,
by prescribing fixed and invariable L. ximum rates, even
could they have constitutionally done so (4 Albany Law
2)5
Journal 355), but contented the:'!iselves by prohibiting
and Ieclarin,- to be unlawful every unjust and unreasona-
ble charge for transportation (t1"e constitutionality
of which re ha-e already discovered), leaving the deter-
mination as to what might constitute an unreasonable
charge Crendent in each particular case upon the re-
sults of the investigations of the commission or the
courts. Vhile not ignorant of the fact that unrestrain-
ed competition between railroads only resulted in a
system of secret robates and favoritism twa,'d ]&r;e
dealers, destroying publicity of rates, et,,bittering
class Trrejudic.s br its tendency to aiI the strong
and depress the weak, not to allude to the moral evil of
fostering corruption in favor of localities and politi-
cal bodies, they did not overlook the fact that irany
cortsid-rations entered into the problem of railway
t'ansportation whic> at first glance are overlooked and
th~at uncler certain conditions, discriminations were
not only not 5est,ructive but highly advantaeo01s to a]l
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clasF;es and business interests. Consequently we find
no general prohibition of discriminations, 5ut only
of unjust disc 'iminat ions which might arise lhen a
greater compensation was receipted fo'om one person
than from another for a substantially similar service.
Iikelvise only unreasonable preferences to co-'porations,
localities o-' any p .rticular description of traffic
are prohibited; while although by the much discussed
"Long and SIort Haul Provision" greater compensaticn
in the aggregate was not to be received for the t,'ans-
portation of persons cr of like kind of property For a
shor-ter than for a longer distance ove, the same line,
the shorter being included within the longer, y2Tt it
is to be particularly noted that such prohibition was
apilicable only where suck transportation was under
substantially similar circumstances and conditions, and
fearful lest this condition should not be found suffi-
ci ent to meet all emergencies a proviso wzs added that
in special cases the commission arrointed under the pro-
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visions (,f the act might, afte- invest ifation, author-
ize a small n- chage for a longer than for a shorter
distance. To quote from the case of "Ex Parte Koel-ler"
(31 Federal Reporter 315), "Congress never intended
to make of this act a Proocrustian bed, in -vIich the
conduct of the business of all the roads engaged in
inter'state commerce shall be m-ade to conform to one
arbitrary rule wiLhout refercence to, the probable and
even unavoidable differences in the conditions and
circumstances under ,,hich it must be transacted." "As
long as people and places differ so widely in c tpabili-
ties and facilities,social or business equality is
impossible."
These fe suggestions as to the nature of ti ose
provisions of the Act about which thcrehave been the
r at est controversy, eviC 'nce the fact that each case
must be judged upon its olAn rerits, and that ther-efore
the success or failure of the Act depends largely xpon
the intelligence and broad mindedness of the commission
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itself. The reiimrk of Mr. Seliginan miade in reference
to the "Long anI Short Haul Clause" is applicable to
many of the most, important provisions of the act.
"The colintry", said this noted economist "is to be
congratulated on the legislative recognition of the
rule; let us trust that Lhere may be equal cause
for confg'atulation on the official recognition of its
limitations." (Political Science Quartely;2~ i3,?7 )
The question, therefore, naturally a,'ises whether this
is not a remarkable power for good or evil to be placed
in the hands of five individuals appointed by the
president, and yet it is in a consideoration of the
character and powers of the commission itself that the
wisdom of congress is most clearly apparent. We find
a body of men created -ith a capacity for great useful-
ness and moral influences, yet possessing little
actual power and -esponsibility. The powers (-f the
commission are c rtainly u.nique and their constitution-
ality l-as not unfrequently been qu-estioned. Py Section
12 the commission "is authorized and required to en-
force the provisions of the Act," and by various other
sections is given power to a certain extent, to de-
termine controve'sies a'ising ,1nder the m)'ovisions
of the Act. Consequently it has been claimed that its
creation was unconstitutional upon the -,round that,
although congress was by the constitution p:iven the
power to create inferior courts, the commissioners
beinp' appointed "'or six years had no such tenure of
office as i. required [-v the constitution of the mem-
bers of such inferior courts. This objection, however,
is fallacious because the commission cannot be deemed
a tribunal althourh it undoubtedly I-ossesses several
remarkable judicial functions. Although by the pro-
visions of Section 9 -any person clP.iming damages for a
violation o e the Act Iay, at his election, lay his com-
plaint before the commission or bring suit in any cir-
cuit or district court of the United States; although
the proceedings before the commission confo-rm in i.'any
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respects t those in ordinary courts of' law, although
a formal complaint is made to the commission, a copy
forwarded to the offending carrier, an answer required
and a-n investigation K ade in order that all parties
interested should have an opportunity to present their
claims; althou -h after such investigation a report of
the findings of fact is made which corresponds very
c]osely to a judicial opinion, and notice sent to the
offendin- carrier to desist from his violation of the
Act or to make certain reparation within a specified
time to the offendinF- carrier as the case may be,
yet there is this essential distinction to be found
between the commission and a court in the fact that
the commission cannot enforce its decrees nor awrard
d;mFages in violation of the seventh amendment of the
Constitution, by which the right of tril by jury is
reserved in Common Law suits, and its only remedy in
case its recoimmendations are ignored is by an action
somewhat in the nature of an appeal to a United States
district or circLit court, in --hich t} e findings of
fact before tI-e commission are prima facie evidence.
Thus the comission, not encroaching upon the rproper
functions of a court, performs functions not very dis-
similar to those possessed !), a referee, investigating
far rniore fully by reason of its technical know-,ledge of
railray questions than could the ciurt itself and yet
at the same time by reason of its inferiority to courts
of law deprived of the power to display favoritism
and corruption.
This creation of congress, however, is not restrict-
ed, as is a court, to a consideration of matters brou ht
to its notice byr an injured party, but on the contrary is
possessed of unlimited authority to enquire upon its
own account or at the instigation of disinterested
parties into the gener-al iianageirient of IuaiJroads, and
for this purpose may compel the attendance of wit-
nesses and the production of documents. As was said
by Henry C. Ad,.ms it possesses "the most reiarkab]e
(spionage and control ever exerted cr, v- any business."
It is not, therefore, in its capacity as a semi-tribunal
for the punisl-nent of violations of the act that is
found the most p-i-usei.,rorthy ciaracteristic feature of
the commission, but ratl-er in the character of an
investigating board, the object of which is to collect
instructive information upon all subjects c(,nnected
with railroad managel,, nt. As Charles Francis Adams
once remarked, "The solution of any pr'oblem is the
creation of an intelligent public opinion regording it,"
and , history of a short three years b1s proven that
an increase oEP reliable information in regard to any
subject of railway interest leads to a reduction of
abtses and renders controversies less n,neris. Recog-
nizing this fact and relizing vat a vast influence
railway probleys have upon all industrial, political
and social problems, congress has clothed this body
-vith unlimited powers of in-estigation. B-j the pro-
visions of Section 20 the commission is authorized
to require annual reports from all carriers subj ect
to the act, at certain specified times, containing not
onlr answers to any specific questions but also con-
taining complete statements of the arnount of capita]
stock and cost of equipments, expenses of management
an ' improvement, earnings and receipts, dividends paid
and balances of profit and loss; and again by Section 12
the production of any books, contracts or documents
relating to any matter under investigation may be de-
manded and a compliance with such demand is enforcable
by Ue courts and a refnsal punishable as a contempt.
Thus the act creates a commission possessing the yower
to make a complete exhibit of all the operations of
the entire railway system of the United States, indus-
trial as well as financial. Accorlingly investigations
have been made as to the mezho .s of ]ihting and beat-
ing in voIue amongt railway corporations, as to the use
of safety appliances and as to the pro,,isions adopted
by the various roads in regard to the technical training
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of employees and the establislnent of reading and eating
rooms for their enjoyment, with the intention doubtless-
ly of educating the carriers as well as the public and
thus pavin: the way for improvements and for ne- legis-
lation upon these and other sirilar points of interest.
H owever important have been the investigations
upon th e subjects of management and equipment, they
are all eclipsed by those made upon the subject of
"rates", a subject of such great importance to both
the railway interests and the public and one into which
so many different elements enter that it is not sur-
prising that it is upon this that the special attention
of the commission has been concentrated. As has already
been su,-gested, congress has only said that rates viust
be just and the commission is left the difficult task
of determining "'hat constitutes injustice. It has been
a principle long recognized in railway eti ics that rates
cannot be proportionate tc the cost of services, for
were this so bulky articles could seldom be carried and
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the development of many important industries would be
destroyed; but on the contrary that they should depend
rather upon tl2e value of the service rendered. Conse-
quently c~assifications of freight have always existed
and although oviirg tlheir very existence to discrimina-
tions yet so far from being founded upon principles of
injustice, good classifications are for various economic
reasons wAhich space prevents our considering, proven to
be an actual benefit even to those e_-lu articles most
discriminated against. Yet it has nevertheless been
discovered b'r the commission that unjust discriryinationv
were made in favor of various parties under the cloak of
classifications. The attempts to romedyr this evil !-ave
been "reatly impeded by the variations in the value of
the same articles in different sections of the country
and the consequent variati(,ns in the classifications
themselves while to add to the difficulty, each ailroad
appeared to have a system of classification reculiar to
itself. To bring harmony out of confusion h':s been the
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work of the commission in this regard. Representatives
fro-i clifferent sections have, at te request of the com-
mission assemblec at Washington for consultation and
now suf!'ice it to say, th@ tcndency is to uniformity
in classification and consequently evasions of the act
bXT this slibterfuge are less fre(uently attempted.
It was the intention of congress, horever, to create
a comnission whose duty it miht be b, their investiga-
tions, to discover and to discourage unjust discrimina-
tions by wlsatever devises t}hey be made. (U. S. v.
Fozer .7 Fed. Rep. i35) Accorringfy vl-etier it arise
by means of an unreasonable re'iuction in rates in favor
of large shipper's for transportation conducted in their
own cars or for articles shipped in one form rather than
in another (Schofield v. Lake Shore & Michigan Southern
R. R. II Interstate Comerce Reports 90); v-'hethcr it
1ave its origin in t-e extravagant and wasteful practice
of employing ticket brokers and scalpers who under the
p-retenc of receiving cormnissions discriminate between
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purchasers, injure the public and afforl no actual ser-
vice to th-e ca,,riers ther,.selves; or wljother it exist in
the employment of a syrstem of free passes which are
most frequently given to those who are least entitled
to them from a financial point of iriew and which can
only tend to injure tho.se not rcceiving them by raising
F7eneral charg;es,--- unjust iscrimination in every form
is found by the commission to be within the conitmplated
pro'-ibition of the act. By numerous exceptions, however,
the solicitation of congress Cor the public weal is evi-
denced and although passes are prohihited notable ex-
ceptions are made in the interests of state or sciehce
or to meet the demands of cl.arity; althour~h the obliga-
tion imposed uion all carriers to keep posted in each
>,epot a scI edule of charges to and from all points, i o-
pether with the further requirement ti-at a ten days
notice shall be given of any advance in such rates but
suggest that variations in rates are to be discouraged,
yet the issuance of mileage, excursion and commutation
tickets which are offer'ed impartially to all can be
productive of no evil and are therefore duly allowed.
(In Matter of Passenger Tariffs II Interstate Corn. Rep.
049), while party 'ates and passenger car load rates,
often productive of evil practices, have been found by
the cornnission to be within the prohibition of the act.
Space, unfortunately, prevents t] e extended dis-
cussion of the "Long and Short Haul" clause of the Act
which its importance might seem to require. Suffice
it to say, that in the construction of the phrase "finder
substantially similar circumstances and conditions" the
commission have exercised that same consideration for
al! interests which has characterized nearly all of their
decisions and which the equities of all parties, consid-
ered from a legal standpoint, demands. Recognizing the
fact that competition is the life of trade, it is only
the injustice which arises from 1 uman agency and not
from uncontrollable circumstance which they have decided
to be un-!er the bane of the law. (Business Tiews Associ-
ation of Minn. v. Chicago,, St. Paul &c R. R. Co. II
Interstate Corn. Rep. $2) Consequently they lave found
that dissimilar circiunstances exist 'herever between
termlfinal points ti ere exists c )-nretition -ith nater
routes, -,ith Canaclian c. otlher roads not subject to the
act and unde- certain peculiar circumstances between
roads subject to the act. (Ex Parte Koehler 32 Fed. Rep.
7)5). As -as sugest d by the commission in the case of
Read v. Chicago and 7. y. R. R. Co. TI Into, state Corn.
Rep. 541, "the question oF' relative inji-stice must be
vie-7ed on a broade ,rcund than the mere balancing of
one rate against another." In fact, tbe mere permission
of group rates is inlicative of the fact that all mater-
ial facts suci as tie character and quality of the com-
modity transported, its cost of production, tiie imRkeL
cost and the interest whic, t} e public -as in the use
of the comodity are all given die consideration in de-
te rmining w ,at may constitute dissimiilar circumstances
and variations from the generJ! rule not unroasonable
in thol-selves are permitted. (Imperial CoFl Co. v.
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Pittsburg & Lake Erie R. R. II InL. Com. Rep. 618). The
fact, too, that the commission has decided, ss it did in
the case of The Missouri Pacific R'y Co. v. Texas 31
Fed. Rep. (2, that the carrier, in the first instance
, ras to be the sole judge as to what miybht constitute
dissimilar circur stances and that the commission would
interfereonly when after investigation it was made to
appear that the judgment of the carrier formulated by
selfish interests, well illustrates the intention of the
commission to interfere with the exercise of the business
discretion of the carriers as little as may be consistent
with the interests of the general public.
In concluding our consideration of the exercise by
congress of its power to regulate cot-rmerce between the
states by the passage of the Interstate Commerce Act, it
may be said that nearly all of the evils which may exist
or have at some time existed in the m ,anagement of rail-
roads o-re their existence to the secrecy of operation so
long controlling in the railway industry. It was this
41
secrecy which, so great is the influence which railways
may exert over all business interests, rendered possi-
ble the creation of the Standard Oil Trust, which encour-
aged -. icriminations between individuals, business in-
te-ests and localities and thus violated one of the
fundamental principles of our governemnt which declares
the absolute equality of all men. Inasmuch, too, as
railroads are in a certain sense creations of the govern-
mient, receiving franchises and having delegated to them
the right of eminent domain and various functions be-
longing only to sovereignty, it is but just that this
great evil of secrecy be removed and that this industry
be subjected to prop -r govprnmental supervision, espec-
i-1!y since adequate remedies for the evils ,rhich have
arisen at their hands are not pr<ovided for by the
Common Law. That the Interstate Commerce Act itself
is libei'al in favor of the corporation over which super-
vision is exercised we have already seen that the con-
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struction put upon it by the commission and the courts
is liberal in favor of the railroads, is filly proven
by the decisions in litigated cases; that the general
verdict of the public is favor!ble is undenied and
already demands are made that the Act be extended so as
to include carriers by water, express companies and
telegraph companies. Such extensions would urdoubtedly
be constitutional and mipg t be Pttended with good re-
sults so long as Congress realizes as it has realized
in the passage of the Interstate Cormnerce Act, t1'at
governrient supervision is widely different from govern-
ment control.
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